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Abstract 
 
This study employs interactive quantile regressions to assess the conditional role of foreign 
aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports in 78 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid indicators are used whereas 
terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. Interactive 
quantile regressions are used. The following findings are established. First, the effects of 
terrorism are both positive and negative across quantiles and specifications, with the impact 
most apparent in the highest and lowest quantiles. Second, while bilateral aid consistently 
decreases (increases) fuel exports at the top (bottom) quantiles, multilateral aid regularly 
decreases fuel exports in the top quantiles. Third, for negative thresholds in the 50
th
 quartile 
and 90
th
 decile, interaction effects between bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics are 
overwhelmingly not significant. Conversely, for transnational terrorism, the interaction effects 
between multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics significantly have negative thresholds. The 
hypothesis of a positive threshold is only confirmed for transnational terrorism and 
multilateral aid at the 90
th
 decile. Justifications for unexpected signs and implications for fuel 
export policy and the management of multinational companies are discussed. This study 
contributes to the literature on the role of external flows in reducing the negative externalities 
of terrorism on development outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
 Over the past decades, terrorism and conflicts have substantially affected petrodollar 
or government revenues in oil-exporting countries. Some notable examples include: Nigeria’s 
oil Delta region with sabotage activities from the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (Obi, 2010; Onuoba, 2010; Akpan et al., 2013; Taylor, 2014); recent Al-Qaeda 
attacks in In Amenas fuel installations of Algeria (Onyeji et al., 2014 ); massive disruption of 
Libyan oil production in the post-Gaddafi era (Gaub, 2014) and the Middle East conflict in 
which the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) now controlling about 90 percent of Syrian 
oil installations can only trade its piecemeal fuel exploration in black and informal markets 
(Le Billon, 2015; Celso, 2015).  
 In light of the above, a growing body of the literature has been focusing on 
instruments by which conflicts and terrorism can be mitigated. To the best of our knowledge, 
some of the documented instruments have included: the need for transparency (Bell et al., 
2014), the relevance of respecting the rule of law (Choi, 2010), imperative for educational 
mechanisms (Brockhoff et al., 2014) like bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008), greater publicity 
and press freedom (Hoffman et al., 2013), behavioural investigations of attitudes towards 
terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and use of military tactics and strategies (Feridun & Shahbaz, 
2010). 
 Another interesting strand of studies has been oriented towards assessing linkages 
between terrorism, violence, political instability and macroeconomic factors. As far as we are 
aware,  this stream of  the literature has focused on inter alia: (i) the effect of terrorism on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008), (ii) interconnections 
between terrorism and innovation (Koh, 2007), (iii) the growth-terrorism nexus, with 
bidirectional causality (Gries et al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013;  Shahzad et al., 2015), 
causality to terrorism from growth (Piazza, 2006; Choi, 2015), causality from terrorism to 
growth (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008, 2009, 2011;  Öcal & Yildirim,   2010; Meierrieks & 
Gries,  2013) and (iv) the relevance of foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect 
of terrorism on development outcomes like  external flows (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), 
conditional on initial levels of external flows (Asongu et al., 2015) or corruption-control 
levels in the domestic countries (Efobi et al., 2015). The present line of inquiry is closest to 
the last stream. Accordingly, we aim to investigate the role of development assistance in 
reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports.  
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 The literature on the terrorism-trade nexus can be discussed in three main streams, 
notably: (i) the impact of terrorism on trade, (ii) the effect of trade on terrorism and (iii) issues 
relating to the empirical modelling of the underlying relationships.  
First, as concerns the incidence of terrorism on trade, four studies come to mind. First, 
Richardson (2004) has engaged security measures that were adopted after the September 11
th
 
2011 terrorists’ attacks in the United States. The plethora of resulting security initiatives has 
been partly motivated by the need to prevent the negative consequences of terrorism on world 
trade. (2) The impact of welfare and terror on trade openness has been investigated by Nitsch 
and Schumacher (2004). Employing an augmented gravity model on 200 countries for the 
period 1960-2003, the authors have used bilateral trade, violence and terrorism indicators to 
conclude that terrorism has a negative effect on trade openness. According to the narrative, a 
doubling of incidents of terrorism reduces bilateral trade by about 4 percent. (3) De Sousa et 
al. (2009a) have accessed the interplay between trade and nearness to the source of terror to 
establish the following key findings. (i) More robust investigations are needed to improve 
scholarly understanding as to how trade in the source-country and neighbouring countries are 
affected by terrorists incidents’ in the former. (ii) There is need for theoretical underpinnings 
to enhance clarity on linkages between transnational terrorism, trade and security policy. (4) 
As an extension of the previous study, De Sousa et al. (2009b) have examined the effect of 
international terrorism diffusion on trade and security. The empirical underpinnings are based 
on the assumption that proximity to terrorism is inversely related to the corresponding 
negative spillovers on trade. Moreover, the intuition for the study is consistent with the 
hypothesis that terror in a source country has negative effects to both the source-country itself 
and neighbouring nations simultaneously. On the other hand, countries that are more 
distantly-located from the ‘source-country of terror’ could be endowed with positive 
externalities in terms of incremental trade,  related/corresponding to the decreasing trade from 
the country affected by terror and/or countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the country 
affected by terror. Overall, three main findings were established. They are: (i) there is a direct 
negative effect of transnational terrorism on trade, (ii) an indirect negative effect of terrorism 
from the source-country to neighbouring countries is apparent and (iii) terrorism increases 
trade in countries that are remote from the ‘source-country of terror’.  
 Second, coming to the impact of trade on terrorism, two studies in the limited literature 
have caught our attention. These have essentially been focused on the commercialisation of 
illegal drugs. (1) Piazza (2011) examined the link between the ‘drugs trade’ and terrorism on 
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the hypothesis that illicit ‘drugs trade’ fuels terrorism. The author has concluded that ‘cocaine 
production’ and illicit drugs are significant drivers of transnational and domestic terrorism. 
Conversely, banning drugs and eradicating illicit crop cultivation leads to the opposite 
outcome. As an extension, Piazza (2012) investigated the connection between the opium trade 
and terrorism in 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996-2008 using binomial regressions. 
The author concluded that provinces where opium is substantially produced are associated 
with relatively higher rates of terrorist attacks and casualties. Therefore, there is a direction of 
causality flowing from the production of opium to terrorism.  
 Third, in the strand on empirical modelling concerns pertaining to the trade-terrorism 
relationship, Mirza and Verdier (2008) surveyed the literature and documented four main 
cautions that should be borne in mind by researchers when investigating the underlying 
association. They comprise the need to: (i) account for omitted indictors that are very likely to 
be correlated with trade and terrorism, (ii) acknowledge the inter-temporal persistence of 
terrorism, (iii) distinguish between the effects of country-specific occurrences from the impact 
of incidents focused on the source-country and (iv) control for endogeneity.  
 The above literature leaves room for improvement in at least four major areas. They 
relate to the imperative of: (i) accounting for more dynamics of terrorism, (ii) exploring 
linkages between foreign policy in the underlying trade-terrorism relationship, (iii) 
considering specific dimensions of trade openness and (iv) adopting more robust empirical 
techniques that control for initial trade levels. We may deal with each in turn. 
First, building on the caution sustained by Choi (2015) on the imperative of exploring 
more indicators when assessing the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic indicators, 
we involve a plethora of terrorism indicators in order to provide room for more policy 
implications, notably: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Consideration of 
these measurements of terrorism is in accordance with recent studies on the nexus between 
terrorism and macroeconomic indicators (Efobi et al., 2015). Moreover, the adoption of more 
terrorism indicators is partially motivated by the need to augment the engaged literature, 
which has been focused on few indicators, notably: (i) transnational terrorism in De Sousa et 
al. (2009ab) and (ii) domestic and transnational terrorism in Piazza (2011).  
 Second, in line with Choi (2015), we attempt to create space for a detailed discussion 
on policy outcomes, by limiting our investigation to the recent body of literature that has 
employed foreign aid as a policy variable in mitigating the hypothetically/documented 
negative effects of terrorism on foreign investment (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu et 
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al., 2015; Efobi et al., 2015). To this end, we employ two foreign aid variables, namely 
multilateral and bilateral aid. The motivation for involving this policy indicator is based on 
the exploratory (Richardson, 2014) and empirical (De Sousa et al., 2009ab) underpinnings 
which show that terrorism reduces trade openness.   
 Third, it is imperative to engage trade-specific dimensions for more targeted policy 
implications. To this end: (i) contrary to previous studies that have used broad trade openness 
indicators (Richardson, 2004; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; De Sousa et al., 2009ab) and (ii) 
consistent with the stream of literature using export-specific variables (Piazza, 2011, 2012),  
we confined the analytical scope to fuel exports. The choice of fuel exports has a twofold 
inspiration, on the one hand, the recent growth resurgence in developing countries has been 
substantially driven by natural resources,  (Amavilah, 2015) especially fuel exports, and (ii) 
on the other, as we have seen in the first paragraph here, terrorist activities have substantially 
affected fuel exports in recent decades. 
 Fourth, motivated by the recommendation of Mirza and Verdier (2008) on the 
imperative for more robust empirical strategies, we adopt an estimation technique that is 
robust to outliers. Moreover, the adopted Qauntile regression strategy also enables us to 
distinguish between initial levels of fuel exports. Accordingly, blanket policies based on the 
investigated relationships may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of 
fuel exports and tailored distinctly across high- and low-‘fuel exporting’ countries.  
 With the above interesting background, this line of inquiry is positioned on 
investigating the role of development assistance in dampening the negative effects of 
terrorism on fuel exports. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the 
period 1984 to 2008. There are at least four reasons for our choice of periodicity and sample. 
First, the starting year is 1984 because institutional data from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) is only available from this year. Second, the focus on developing countries is in 
tune with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who have established that negative consequences 
from terrorism are more apparent in developing countries vis-à-vis advanced nations. This is 
essentially because; the latter countries have the financial, logical and technological means 
needed to absorb the negative effects of terrorism without substantial macroeconomic 
consequences. Third, development assistance is principally channelled from more advanced 
economies to less developed countries. Hence, the empirical scope on these underdeveloped 
countries, contingent on a foreign aid variable is naturally justified. Fourth, a motivation for 
the present study is also to compare findings with those of the available literature that 
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employed the same sample and periodicity, particularly:  Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi 
et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015).   
The positioning of this inquiry steers clear of recent literature on international business 
and strategic management on the relationship between conflicts and development outcomes. 
In particular,  studies on the identification of antecedents for, and consequences of low 
intensity inter-unit conflict in Multinational Companies (MNCs) (Lauring et al., 2017), the 
exploration of how and why MNCs proactively address the concern of uncertainty by valuing 
locational ambidexterity in decision making (Huang & John, 2017), the relevance of political 
risk (law and order, internal conflict and ethnic tension) in determining foreign direct and 
indirect investments in developing countries (Al-Khouri, 2015),  strategies of MNCs in which 
terrorism is factored-in as a fundamental threat (Suder & Czinkota, 2005), macroeconomic 
models of political risk assessments (Alon & Martin, 1998) and the effects of risks (political, 
economic, default and credit) on the allocative efficiency of global financial markets 
(Ramcharran, 2003).  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings 
and international business and strategy are presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data 
and methodology.  The empirical results, discussion and policy implications are covered in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Stylized Facts, Theoretical Underpinnings and International Business and Strategy  
2. 1 Stylized facts and theoretical underpinnings   
According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), over 13 percent of the global Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in  2014 was lost to violence-related expenditure (Anderson, 2015). According 
to the report, approximately 14.3 trillion USD or 13.4 percent of Global GDP was invested in 
curtailing violence, crimes, conflicts, political instability and terrorism. The underlying 
expenditure is equivalent to the combined GDP of Germany, Spain, France, Canada, Brazil 
and the United Kingdom. Consistent with the report, a substantial amount of the expenditure 
is skewed towards terrorism-related activities. Projections show that terrorists’ activities are 
likely to increase in the coming years owing to burgeoning terrorism networks which have 
been proliferating in operational scope, representing about a 61 percent rise in killings as of 
2014 compared to 2008.  
The 2014 GPI account is supported by the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, 
p. 13), which concluded that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, terrorism has 
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substantially increased.  As cases of reference to this point, six main stylized facts are 
apparent to the best of our knowledge (Asongu et al. 2015). First, Libya in the post-Gaddafi 
era has become a failed state, with widespread anarchy and societal breakdown, characterised 
by various rebel factions and two rival governments clamouring to dictate the law of the land 
and run a substantially deteriorated oil-dependent economy. Second, the situation in Yemen 
has severely deteriorated with the inability of the government to honour the terms of its socio-
economic contracts with the Yemini citizens after the overthrow of President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh. As we write this paper, a proxy war is being fought between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
who are supporting rebels and the government respectively. Third, the 2015 Garissa 
university killings and 2013 Westgate shopping mall attacks by Al-Shabab in Kenya have 
illustrated that the Somali Al-Quaeda affiliated Al-Shabab can inflict substantial transnational 
terrorism causalities which have significant disruptive consequences to education and tourism. 
Fourth, in Tunisia after a wave of post-Arab Spring political assassinations, the newly 
democratically elected government is being seriously confronted with a wave of tourist-
targeted attacks, namely the: the Bardo National Museum and Sousse attacks in March and 
June of 2015 respectively. Fifth, the Boko Haram of Nigeria is extending its terrorism sphere 
to the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Sixth, externalities of the Iraq 
and Syria conflicts have produced a very powerful ISIL that is now exerting substantial 
geopolitical effects throughout the world, namely the: (i) December 2014 hostage crisis in  
Sydney-Australia, (ii) January 2015 foiled Verviers-Belgium attacks, (iii) January 2015 the  
‘Charlie Hebdo’ attacks in Paris-France and (iv) the foiled February 2015 Australian attacks, 
inter alia. 
 Whereas there are some externalities in the developed world, it is important to note 
that a substantial number of terrorist activities are perpetrated in the developing world 
(Anderson, 2015).  This has increased poverty-related concerns in policy-making circles, 
given that the year 2014 registered the highest number of internally displaced persons since 
the Second World War. This finding by the 2015 GPI report
1
 presents a bleak prospect for 
developing countries when combined with the mid-April 2015 publication by the World Bank 
of its World Development Indicators. The latter report  concluded that many developing 
countries, especially  those in Sub-Saharan Africa have still a long way to go in attaining the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015; 
Caulderwood, 2015). Given that most of the growth needed to alleviate  poverty in developing 
                                                          
1
 The 2014 GPI should not be confused with the 2015 GPI report because the latter documents the former.  
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countries is resource-driven, understanding the role of foreign aid in reducing the potentially 
negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports is a line of inquiry of considerable policy 
relevance.   
 Consistent with the recommendation of De Sousa et al. (2009a) on the need to clearly 
articulate theoretical concepts motivating studies investigating the relationship between 
terrorism and macroeconomic variables, we briefly highlight the theories underpinning the 
present line of inquiry. In line with the underlying terrorism literature (Efobi et al., 2015; 
Asongu et al., 2015), two main theories which are documented by Akinwale (2010, p. 125) 
are used to provide the foundations for the current study, namely: the Conflict Management 
Model (CMM) of Thomas-Kilman (1992) and the Social Control Theory (SCT) from Black 
(1990).  Under the CMM, intentions of strategic character have a high likelihood of rotating 
around a two-factor matrix (of assertiveness and cooperation), when combined with 
collaboration produce five principal styles of conflict management, namely: avoidance, 
compromise, collaboration, competition and accommodation. On the other hand, according to 
the SCT, relationships between organisations, individuals and groups influence the exercise of 
one out of five main channels of social control, involving: negotiation, avoidance, settlement, 
self-help and tolerance. This theoretical basis is consistent with the conflict management and 
peace literature (Borg, 1992; Volkema & Bergmann, 1995) and in agreement with the present  
study because foreign aid is employed as a policy variable in order to provide an enabling 
environment for the mitigation of terrorism, especially: (i) the improvement of government 
expenditure according to Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) and (ii) education and the rule of law 
(Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009), among 
others.  
   
2.2 International business and strategy  
There are various international business approaches that are adopted by managers of MNCs to 
reduce the effects of terrorism on the cost of doing business internally. Consistent with 
Mazzarella (2005), this section is organised in two main strands, namely: (i) identifying the 
cost of terrorism in international business and (ii) managing the risk associated with terrorism. 
 With respect to the management of the risk that terrorism poses to MNCs, two points 
are worth emphasising.  They are: (i) terrorism management methods and (ii) risk modelling.  
On the one hand, minimising the cost of terrorism fundamentally depends on risk modelling 
effectiveness. The standard contemporary practice for most managers consists of estimating 
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future loses with computer risk modelling which uses physical security analysis as inputs to 
determine the probability of attacks from terrorists and the potential level of damages. This 
ultimately informs the managers on the level of terrorism related risk insurance coverage 
needed for a particular business operation.  On the other hand, there are various terrorism risk 
management methods that are adopted by managers, notably: maintaining good human rights 
and environmental records within regions in which they operate; using subcontractors to 
reduce further risk; hiring more security consultants and personnel; hardening of work sites 
and physical assets and training of personnel to avoid being the target of terrorism.  
 The potential costs of terrorism in international business can be seen from four main 
angles, namely: (i) improving the physical security of personnel, plant and equipment, (ii) 
hiring security consultants, (iii) improving global supply chains by securing the transportation 
of commodities as well as the risks related to the disruption of global sources of supply, (iii) 
reducing direct operations and investment in areas of high risk and (iv) political risk 
insurance.  
 The above theoretical underpinnings are broadly consistent with the recent 
international business literature on the strategies of managing the negative externalities of 
terrorism, namely: planning for potential effects of terrorism (Harvey et al., 2017) the 
management of people in hostile environments (Barder et al., 2015), especially expatriate 
personnel (Barder & Berg, 2014a; Bader et al., 2016; Barder & Berg, 2014b) and Corporate 
Social Responsibility by MNCs as a strategic management tool (Agwu & Taylor, 2015).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
  We examine a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008 
from Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015). The choice of sample and 
periodicity has already been justified in the introduction
2
. The data entails non-overlapping 
intervals in terms of three-year averages. The dependent variable is ‘fuel exports’ while the 
                                                          
2 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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independent variables of interest are indicators of terrorism, namely: unclear, domestic, 
transnational and total terrorism dynamics. Two foreign aid variables are employed: 
multilateral and bilateral aid.   
 The variables are originally from three principal sources, namely: (i) the incidence of 
terrorism from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012), (ii) the Global Terrorism 
Database and (iii) the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Three main 
justifications influence the choice of periodicity and sample. First, in accordance with 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), relative to more advanced economies, the negative 
consequences of terrorism are visible in developing nations. As we said earlier, this 
asymmetric effect is essentially because, developing countries do not have the adequate 
financial, logistical and technological mechanisms that are needed to absorb the negative 
consequences associated with terrorism. Second, foreign aid is logically channelled to 
developing nations from their more developed counterparts. Third, we aim to compare the 
findings established with a stream of literature that has used the same database, notably 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015).  
We define terrorism as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-national actors 
with the principal mission of using intimidation to secure political ambitions (see Enders & 
Sandler, 2006). The terrorism indicators measure the number of yearly terrorism incidents 
registered in a country. In order to reduce mathematical concerns that are linked to log-
transforming zeros and correct the positive skew in the data, the study uses the natural 
logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base.  Such a transformation procedure 
is consistent with recent terrorism literture (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 
2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 
6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve[s] the 
nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and 
supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism 
including those acts of terrorism that concern[s] at least two countries. This implies that the 
perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is 
from another”. Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms. 
The dependent variable, aid and control covariates are from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. We also take the natural logarithm of fuel exports. Therefore exports 
12 
 
of value zero are considered as missing data after the log transformation.  The three countries 
without any data on fuel exports are Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The concern of zeros is more apparent in the count data (i.e. terrorism 
variables) than in fuel exports. The development assistance data are disbursements of aid from 
Development Assistance Committee countries.   
The control variables comprise: trade openness, exchange rate, infrastructure, 
political globalisation, inflation and internal conflicts. The choice of control variables is in 
accordance with the FDI-terrorism literature (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). 
Based on our expectations, infrastructural development, increasing exchange rates and trade 
openness should have positive effects on fuel exports (Akpan, 2014), while civil/internal 
conflicts and inflation should exert opposite effects. For example, high exchange rates have 
been documented to boost exports in developing countries (Rodrik, 2008). Whereas stable and 
low inflation is conducive for economic prosperity, chaotic inflation may decrease fuel 
exports owing to a negative economic outlook. This is essentially because investors have been 
shown to prefer strategies of investment that are void of ambiguity (Le Roux & Kelsey, 
2015ab). The expected sign of political globalisation cannot be established a priori because it 
depends to a great extent on leverage in decision making at the international level. The 
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1.  
The summary statistics of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. From it, two 
points are note worthy. On the one hand, the means of the variables are comparable. On the 
other, based on the variations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated relations would 
emerge. The objective of the correlation matrix presented in Appendix 3 is to examine and 
avoid potential concerns of multicollinearity which we have highlighted in bold. We observe 
from this matrix that terrorism and foreign aid variables are highly correlated among 
themselves. Hence, we avoid employing more than two foreign aid and terrorism variables in 
the same specification.  
  
3.2 Methodology 
In accordance with the underlying literature on conditional macroeconomic 
determinants (Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu et al., 2015), in order to examine if initial levels 
of fuel exports matter in how the independent variables interplay in influencing fuel exports, 
we employ a quantile regression (QR) estimation strategy. It entails, investigating the 
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determinants of fuel exports throughout the conditional distributions of fuel exports (Keonker 
& Hallock, 2001).  
Previous literature on linkages between terrorism and macroeconomic variables has 
reported parameters estimates at the conditional mean of macroeconomic indicators 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). Whereas mean impacts are certainly 
relevant, we extend the underlying stream of terrorism studies by employing QR which 
distinguishes between initial export levels. For instance, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
is based on the supposition that error terms and the dependent variable are normally  
distributed, the QR approach is not founded on the hypothesis of normally distributed error  
terms. Hence, this strategy enables us to examine the impacts on the dependent variable with 
particular emphasis on low- medium- and high-fuel exporting countries. Accordingly, with 
QR, parameter estimates are derived at multiple points on the conditional distributions of fuel 
exports (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). The QR technique is increasingly being employed in 
development literature, notably in: corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 
2012; Asongu, 2013) and financial development (Asongu et al., 2017; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017) studies.   
The  th quantile estimator of fuel exports is obtained by solving for the optimization 
problem in Eq. (1), which is presented without subscripts for ease of presentation and of 
simplicity.  
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where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised, for 
instance the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quartiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of fuel exports or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                                                                                                          (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of fuel exports. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is the fuel exports indicator while ix  contains a constant term, trade 
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openness, inflation, infrastructure, exchange rates, political globalisation and civil/internal 
conflicts. The specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the multicollinearity concerns 
highlighted in Appendix 3. 
 Considering that the strategy of estimation we have adopted involves interactive 
regressions, we briefly engage Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls of interactive regressions. 
For the estimation output to have economic meaning, the corresponding estimated interactive 
coefficients should be interpreted as conditional marginal effects. Moreover, the modifying or 
foreign aid indicator should be within the range provided by the summary statistics for the 
overall marginal effect to have economic meaning.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Table 1 and Table 2 present results corresponding to bilateral aid and multilateral aid 
regressions respectively. All the tables entail four-sets of specifications. They are: (i) 
domestic and transnational terrorism modelling in Panel A and (ii) unclear and total terrorism 
estimations in Panel B.  More specifically, the left-hand-side (LHS) of Panel A (B) display 
findings for domestic (unclear) terrorism whereas the right-hand-side (RHS) of Panel A (B) 
show results for transnational (total) terrorism. For either table, we consistently notice that the 
QR estimates are different from the OLS estimates in terms of signs and significance. This 
further justifies the relevance of the QR strategy.  
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 1 on linkages between 
fuel exports, bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics. First, with the exception of domestic 
terrorism which is not significant across fuel export distributions, the effects of terrorism are 
consistently significant in the 50
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile. While these underlying effects are 
positive for unclear terrorism, the impact in the 50
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile are respectively 
positive and negative for transnational and total terrorism. Second, bilateral aid consistently 
increases (decreases) fuel exports at the bottom (top) quantiles. Third, interaction effects 
between bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics are overwhelmingly not significant, but for the 
50
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile on the LHS of Panel B in unclear terrorism regressions for which 
the effects are negative. The corresponding modifying bilateral aid thresholds are within the 
range (0.765 to 8.362) provided by the summary statistics, notably: (i) 5.702 (0.211/0.037) for 
the 50
th
 quartiles and (ii) 4.750 (0.133/0.028) for the 90
th
 decile. Fourth, most of the control 
variables are significant with the expected signs. Infrastructural development and political 
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globalisation are positively associated with resource exports (Apkan, 2014). The sparsely 
positive effect of civil/internal conflict is consistent with the effects of terrorism while the 
scantily positive impact of inflation may be traceable to stable consumer prices (with a mean 
value of 2.414). 
 
Table 1: Fuel Exports, Bilateral Aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Fuel Exports (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -5.63** -13.41** -8.511** -6.925** 1.394 2.826** -5.873** -14.76** -7.634* -8.09*** 0.779 2.975** 
 (0.035) (0.013) (0.012) (0.034) (0.616) (0.052) (0.029) (0.016) (0.055) (0.007) (0.775) (0.010) 
Domter 0.005 0.004 -0.0007 0.026 0.004 -0.006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.636) (0.835) (0.950) (0.104) (0.663) (0.127)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.107 -0.010 0.152 0.187* 0.096 -0.075* 
       (0.148) (0.952) (0.275) (0.092) (0.280) (0.068) 
LnBilaid 0.112 0.586** 0.372 0.233 -0.234 -
0.195*** 
0.136 0.530* 0.369** 0.367** -0.232 -0.200*** 
 (0.403) (0.020) (0.320) (0.137) (0.116) (0.00) (0.318) (0.061) (0.049) (0.010) (0.114) (0.000) 
Domter* LnBilaid -0.001 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.004 -0.001 0.0004 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.568) (0.915) (0.838) (0.150) (0.429) (0.573)       
Tranater* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.018 0.005 -0.024 -0.029 -0.022 0.011 
       (0.180) (0.885) (0.311) (0.143) (0.182) (0.190) 
LnTrade -0.296 -1.051* -0.568 -0.137 0.236 0.166 -0.252 -1.170 -0.589 -0.028 0.249 0.190 
 (0.283) (0.099) (0.131) (0.695) (0.380) (0.190) (0.359) (0.101) (0.182) (0.928) (0.353) (0.066) 
LnInflation -0.031 -0.065 -0.080 -0.058 0.175 0.085 -0.044 -0.047 -0.105 -0.082 0.128 0.084* 
 (0.742) (0.750) (0.520) (0.654) (0.116) (0.107) (0.638) (0.836) (0.469) (0.484) (0.274) (0.053) 
LnInfrastructure  0.422*** 0.689* 0.409* 0.506 0.215 0.049 0.408** 0.663 0.433* 0.513*** 0.238 0.032 
 (0.008) (0.075) (0.064) (0.012) (0.231) (0.552) (0.011) (0.125) (0.088) (0.005) (0.173) (0.649) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.028 0.005 -0.071 -0.017 0.023 0.013 -0.030 -0.011 -0.067 -0.029 0 .016 0.012 
 (0.506) (0.959) (0.169) (0.713) (0.618) (0.433) (0.474) (0.926) (0.257) (0.496) (0.719) (0.521) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  1.612*** 2.720** 1.998*** 1.631** 0.283 0.302 1.607*** 3.248** 1.798** 1.635*** 0.447 0.265 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.646) (0.313) (0.006) (0.010) (0.028) (0.008) (0.451) (0.274) 
Civil Conflicts  0.104 -0.059 0.074 0.035 0.177 0.138*** 0.088 -0.0009 0.082 0.011 0.151 0.109*** 
 (0.257) (0.780) (0.512) (0.733) (0.044) (0.000) (0.325) (0.997) (0.531) (0.896) (0.101) (0.002) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.063 0.120 0.072 0.040 0.038 0.050 0.065 0.118 0.072 0.043 0.035 0.046 
Fisher  3.21***      3.45***      
Observations  448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -5.457** -14.7*** -7.904** -6.934* 1.539 2.846** -5.650** -
14.24*** 
-8.166** -7.437** 1.440 2.923** 
 (0.042) (0.008) (0.019) (0.057) (0.510) (0.028) (0.034) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.646) (0.012) 
Unclter  0.073 0.074 -0.009 0.211* 0.042 0.133*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.450) (0.618) (0.914) (0.096) (0.482) (0.000)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.006 0.005 -0.0007 0.022* 0.004 -0.005** 
       (0.541) (0.735) (0.935) (0.065) (0.587) (0.043) 
LnBilaid 0.114 0.692** 0.365** 0.275 -0.221* -0.177** 0.117 0.648** 0.388** 0.252* -0.234 -0.192*** 
 (0.388) (0.012) (0.021) (0.110) (0.095) (0.010) (0.386) (0.015) (0.012) (0.081) (0.165) (0.001) 
Unclter * LnBilaid -0.014 -0.011 -0.001 -0.037* -0.012 -
0.028*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.370) (0.698) (0.943) (0.095) (0.213) (0.000)       
Totter* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.003 -0.001 0.0004 
       (0.474) (0.941) (0.872) (0.102) (0.385) (0.409) 
LnTrade -0.326 -1.146* -0.571 -0.288 0.207 0.184 -0.298 -1.093* -0.560 -0.134 0.229 0.157 
 (0.241) (0.079) (0.193) (0.465) (0.375) (0.119) (0.282) (0.074) (0.128) (0.678) (0.454) (0.144) 
LnInflation -0.038 0.002 -0.091 -0.036 0.145 0.074* -0.032 -0.021 -0.079 -0.056 0.173 0.086** 
 (0.676) (0.991) (0.462) (0.802) (0.149) (0.087) (0.733) (0.913) (0.526) (0.639) (0.168) (0.046) 
16 
 
LnInfrastructure  0.419*** 0.726* 0.417* 0.536** 0.233 0.012 0.422*** 0.749* 0.423** 0.479** 0.221 0.052 
 (0.009) (0.082) (0.055) (0.017) (0.131) (0.887) (0.008) (0.058) (0.046) (0.010) (0.278) (0.460) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.029 0.028 -0.078 0.002 0.019 0.005 -0.028 0.021 -0.073 -0.024 0.022 0.014 
 (0.496) (0.802) (0.128) (0.964) (0.634) (0.764) (0.502) (0.843) (0.135) (0.589) (0.678) (0.340) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  1.604*** 2.940*** 1.868*** 1.676** 0.272 0.289 1.614*** 2.819*** 1.883*** 1.734*** 0.281 0.283 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.027) (0.601) (0.300) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.687) (0.246) 
Civil Conflicts  0.109 0.024 0.060 0.059 0.169** 0.101*** 0. 106 -0.056 0.064 0.039 0.178* 0.139*** 
 (0.176) (0.897) (0.564) (0.577) (0.020) (0.000) (0.251) (0.786) 0.552) (0.675) (0.077) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.065 0.118 0.073 0.041 0.041 0.053 0.0638 0.119 0.073 0.041 0.039 0.050 
Fisher  3.31***     3.21***       
Observations  448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo 
R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Fuel Exports, Multilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Fuel Exports 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -5.567** -
15.35*** 
-9.75*** -7.24*** 1.028 1.290 -5.586** -
16.24*** 
-
11.26*** 
-7.181*** 2.533 1.184 
 (0.032) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.722) (0.404) (0.032) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.417) (0.451) 
Domter 0.006** 0.011 0.009 0.008 -0.001 0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.044) (0.303) (0.122) (0.158) (0.779) (0.006)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.039* 0.042 0.067 0.046 -0.005 -0.046*** 
       (0.086) (0.672) (0.142) (0.190) (0.908) (0.000) 
LnMulaid -0.173 -0.136 -0.093 -0.179 -0.324** -
0.202*** 
-0.173 -0.169 -0.135 -0.215** -0.353** -0.231*** 
 (0.147) (0.677) (0.556) (0.100) (0.010) (0.000) (0.171) (0.618) (0.447) (0.035) (0.011) (0.000) 
Domter* LnMulaid -0.001** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.0008 -
0.002*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.029) (0.715) (0.156) (0.069) (0.526) (0.000)       
Tranater* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.011* -0.003 -0.014 -0.012 -0.007 0.010* 
       (0.086) (0.822) (0.225) (0.206) (0.527) (0.063) 
LnTrade -0.363 -0.930 -0.728* -0.219 0.232 0.373** -0.337 -1.013 -0.531 -0.183 0.133 0.357** 
 (0.193) (0.216) (0.062) (0.414) (0.402) (0.010) (0.227) (0.201) (0.230) (0.464) (0.659) (0.013) 
LnInflation -0.038 -0.435* -0.094 -0.028 0.141 0.109* -0.036 -0.347 -0.061 -0.002 0.078 0.107 
 (0.696) (0.077) (0.458) (0.780) (0.267) (0.081) (0.704) (0.176) (0.667) (0.977) (0.568) (0.071) 
LnInfrastructure  0.221 0.313 0.084 0.327* 0.091 0.009 0.213 0.255 0.042 0.192 0.086 -0.015 
 (0.216) (0.530) (0.725) (0.052) (0.650) (0.934) (0.232) (0.613) (0.871) (0.214) (0.696) (0.887) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.005 -0.080 -0.058 0.048 0.060 0.019 -0.005 -0.077 -0.066 0.033 0.082 0.028 
 (0.908) (0.549) (0.269) (0.211) (0.228) (0.315) (0.905) (0.566) (0.279) (0.363) (0.139) (0.272) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  2.052*** 4.332*** 3.142*** 2.270*** 0.448 0.419 2.033*** 4.670*** 3.346*** 2.319*** 0.235 0.488 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.488) (0.241) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.735) (0.167) 
Civil Conflicts  0.135 0.099 0.124 0.207** 0.079 0.180*** 0.118 0.125 0.124 0.106 0.070 0.109** 
 (0.144) (0.676) (0.259) (0.010) (0.401) (0.000) (0.178) (0.623) (0.319) (0.134) (0.490) (0.018) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.074 0.114 0.074 0.047 0.056 0.062 0.073 0.110 0.073 0.046 0.054 0.054 
Fisher 5.38***      4.73***      
Observations  444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
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 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -5.485** -
17.04*** 
-
10.07*** 
-7.43*** 3.233 1.546 -5.547** -
15.25*** 
-9.86*** -7.510*** 1.071 1.248 
 (0.036) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.240) (0.295) (0.033) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.706) (0.420) 
Unclter  0.053** 0.142* 0.084** 0.055 -0.013 0.0006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.020) (0.055) (0.014) (0.174) (0.786) (0.961)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005** 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.0001 0.003*** 
       (0.037) (0.248) (0.070) (0.129) (0.966) (0.003) 
LnMulaid -0.176 -0.086 -0.121 -0.181* -
0.331*** 
-
0.210*** 
-0.170 -0.138 -0.112 -0.171* -
0.324*** 
-0.206*** 
 (0.128) (0.788) (0.391) (0.095) (0.004) (0.000) (0.155) (0.672) (0.475) (0.099) (0.009) (0.000) 
Unclter * LnMulaid -
0.011*** 
-0.022 -
0.017*** 
-0.011 -0.002 -
0.006*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.111) (0.008) (0.120) (0.747) (0.000)       
Totter* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001** -0.0007 -0.001* -0.002* -0.001 -0.002*** 
       (0.018) (0.703) (0.099) (0.053) (0.372) (0.000) 
LnTrade -0.363 -1.009 -0.740** -0.217 0.073 0.371*** -0.367 -0.922 -0.730* -0.230 0.216 0.374*** 
 (0.192) (0.196) (0.034) (0.431) (0.781) (0.005) (0.190) (0.222) (0.060) (0.374) (0.432) (0.008) 
LnInflation -0.045 -0.268 -0.084 -0.011 0.062 0.098* -0.039 -0.452* -0.082 -0.018 0.125 0.107* 
 (0.633) (0.286) (0.489) (0.914) (0.592) (0.054) (0.688) (0.068) (0.512) (0.853) (0.314) (0.090) 
LnInfrastructure  0.208 0.383 0.037 0.198 0.128 0.001 0.221 0.295 0.036 0.285* 0.099 0.005 
 (0.244) (0.455) (0.864) (0.247) (0.503) (0.987) (0.215) (0.537) (0.875) (0.077) (0.615) (0.962) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -
0.003*** 
-0.049 -0.063 0.024 0.071 0.028 -0.005 -0.087 -0.056 0.034 0.062 0.020 
 (0.000) (0.714) (0.195) (0.532) (0.129) (0.237) (0.904) (0.514) (0.281) (0.354) (0.207) (0.470) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  2.043*** 4.671*** 3.279*** 2.382*** 0.096 0.364 2.049*** 4.317*** 3.199*** 2.361*** 0.456 0.433 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.875) (0.254) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.471) (0.212) 
Civil Conflicts  0.103 0.055 0.090 0.042 0.067 0.122*** 0.134 0.090 0.127 0.163** 0.085 0.183*** 
 (0.185) (0.792) (0.315) (0.558) (0.420) (0.000) (0.144) (0.704) (0.258) (0.033) (0.367) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.075 0.116 0.077 0.0482 0.054 0.058 0.074 0.114 0.074 0.048 0.057 0.062 
Fisher 7.25***      5.60***      
Observations  444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least. 
 
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on linkages between fuel 
exports, multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics. First, the effects of terrorism are consistently 
significant in the highest and lowest quintiles, especially with: (i) positive effects in the 90
th
  
deciles for total terrorism and domestic terrorism; (ii) a negative impact in the 90
th
 decile for 
transnational terrorism and (iii) positive impacts in the 10
th
 decile and 25
th
 quartile for unclear 
terrorism. Second, multilateral aid steadily decreases fuel exports at the top quantiles (50
th
 to 
90
th
) for the most part. Third, interaction effects between multilateral aid and terrorism 
dynamics are significantly negative, but for transnational terrorism in the RHS of Panel A. 
Moreover, the corresponding modifying thresholds of multilateral aid are within the range 
provided by the summary statistics, particularly: -1.249 to 7.105. Accordingly, there is: (i) a 
negative threshold of  2.000 (0.004/0.002) for domestic terrorism in the 90
th
 decile; (ii)  a 
positive threshold of 4.600 (0.046/0.010) for transnational terrorism in the 90
th
 decile; (iii) a 
negative threshold of  4.941  (0.084/0.017) for unclear terrorism  in the 25
th
 quartile  and (iv) 
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a negative threshold of  1.500 (0.003/0.002) for total terrorism in the 90
th
 decile. Fourth, the 
discourse on the significant control variables is consistent with that on Table 1.  
 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
 We discuss the findings in more depth along three main lines: (i) the dynamic impact 
of terrorism, (ii) the effects of foreign aid dynamics and (iii) the diverging thresholds from 
interactive effects between foreign aid and terrorism on fuel exports.  
First, the effects of terrorism are both positive and negative across quintiles and 
specifications, with the impact most apparent in the highest and lowest quantiles.  This 
implies that terrorism affects fuel exports in countries with the highest and lowest initial 
levels of fuel exports. While the effect of total terrorism is mixed because it is negative 
(positive) in bilateral (multilateral) aid regressions, the impact of unclear, domestic and 
transnational terrorism is not definite in sign, albeit, at differing quantiles across bilateral and 
multilateral aid regressions. Evidence of causality flowing from terrorism to fuel exports is 
broadly in accordance with a stream of the engaged literature, particularly Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004); Richardson (2004) and De Sousa et al. (2009ab).  
Second, while bilateral aid persistently decreases (increases) fuel exports at the top 
(bottom) quantiles, multilateral aid consistently decreases fuel exports at the top quantiles. It 
follows that foreign aid decreases fuel exports in countries with initially very high exports of 
fuel while bilateral aid increases it in countries where initial export levels are relatively low. 
Two puzzling concerns boldly standout: (i) the issue of why bilateral aid is positively 
significant in bottom quantiles as opposed to multilateral aid and (ii) the concern of why 
foreign aid in high fuel exporting countries has a negative outcome on the dependent variable.  
(1) With the first concern, the relative effectiveness of bilateral aid vis-à-vis multilateral aid is 
consistent with the narratives of Asongu et al. (2015) on the political economy of 
development assistance. According to this study, the strings tied to bilateral aid entail 
relatively less conflicting interests. Conversely, with multilateral aid, there are more 
contradictory objectives between donors at play. Hence, the corresponding difficulty in 
consensus-building among donors may eventually lead to less appealing significant effects on 
development outcomes. Whereas a recent survey of the literature has been inconclusive on 
significant differences in terms of development outcomes for bilateral aid vis-à-vis 
multilateral aid (Biscaye et al., 2015), the basis for our interpretation is deeply rooted in the 
documented evidence that former colonial powers preserve various strategic interests in 
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former colonies and hence can more effectively allocate development assistance towards 
fighting terrorism and boosting natural resource exports
3
. Contemporary examples include the 
recent military intervention of France in the Central African Republic and Mali on the one 
hand and the exploitation of uranium in Niger following the latest presidential elections 
(Melly & Darracq, 2013). As a policy implication, relative to multilateral aid, bilateral aid 
more positively influences fuel exports in low-fuel exporting countries.   
(2) On the concern as to why foreign aid generally reduces fuel exports in high-
exporting countries, we think that sampled countries within the high-end of the distribution 
may find it strategically relevant to decrease their volume of fuel exports, given that 
government revenue and other needed finance may already have been boosted by foreign aid 
external flows. As a policy implication, while bilateral aid should be encouraged in 
stimulating fuel exports in low-exporting countries, the use and composition of multilateral 
aid flows should also be changed in order to reverse their negative effect on fuel exports in 
high-exporting countries.  
 Third, we have established that, but for negative thresholds in the 50
th
 quartile and 90
th
 
decile, interaction effects between bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics are overwhelmingly 
not significant. Conversely, but for transnational terrorism, the interaction effects between 
multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics significantly have negative thresholds. It follows that 
a positive threshold is only confirmed for transnational terrorism and multilateral aid at the 
90
th
 decile. The overwhelming negative interaction effect may be traceable to the negative 
effect of foreign aid on the dependent variable, especially in high-fuel exporting countries. As 
a policy implication, it is important to first establish the nexus between foreign aid and fuel 
exports before employing the former to mitigate the potentially negative effect of terrorism on 
the latter.  
 Consistent with the motivation of this study which has been partially based on the 
need to compare results with previous studies that have employed the same periodicity and 
sample, we briefly engage in how our findings improve the existing literature on linkages 
between macroeconomic indicators and terrorism. First, it is important to note that (i) 
                                                          
3
 The stance on conflicting donor interest is in line with the conclusions of Asongu (2014d)  “Aid is the outcome 
of bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and 
recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these vary over time. For instance, 
economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in 
French aid. Hence, few would object to the inference that our findings may also be explained by a motivation of 
the French to maintain their colonial legacies and influence in Africa” (p. 472).  
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Bandyopadhyay et al (2014) and Efobi et al (2015) have used the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) and (ii) Asongu et al. (2015) have used a QR strategy to assess how foreign 
aid could be used to mitigate the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. While Efobi et al. (2015) 
have extended Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) using a more robust GMM technique and 
conditioning the nexuses on corruption-control levels in recipient countries, Asongu et al. 
(2015) have extended the two underlying studies by using QR to assess the relationships 
throughout the conditional distributions of FDI.  
 It should be noted that the results of latter studies have not been in support of 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), especially, on (i) an exclusively negative terrorism-FDI nexus 
and (ii) a positive impact on FDI from aid-terrorism interactions. Results of the present study 
have improved existing knowledge in this stream of literature by: (i) employing fuel exports 
as the dependent variable; (ii) partially validating the results of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) 
on the impact of aid, terrorism and corresponding interactions on macroeconomic indicators 
and (iii) partially confirming the positions of Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015) that 
the underlying effects of the independent indicators of interest on macroeconomic variables 
cannot be a priori established from intuition because they depend on, among others, the 
dependent variable, methodology and distribution of the dependent variable.  
 
4. 3 Managerial implications for multinational companies 
It is apparent from intuition that terrorism increases the cost of the risk of doing business, 
regardless of the nature of the business. Conversely, we have established in the study that (i) 
terrorism could both positively and negatively affect fuel exports and (ii) the potentially 
instrumental role of foreign aid in mitigating the effect of terrorism on fuel exports does not 
withstand empirical scrutiny.  
While the negative effects of terrorism on fuel exports are consistent with the intuition 
motivating the study, we have also established that terrorism has a positive influence on fuel 
exports in some quantiles. This tendency is supported by the findings of De Sousa et al. 
(2009b) who established that remote terrorism positively affects some dynamics of trade. 
Moreover, on a more substantive note, the intuition for the positive effect has basis in the 
assumption that some investors in natural resources may be inclined to invest more in the fuel 
industry if they anticipate higher returns in the short-, medium- and long-terms, relative to the 
present risk of terrorism. More contemporary examples with which to substantiate this 
proposition include: (i) growing investments from China in the Nigerian Delta region despite 
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evolving threats from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Obi, 
2008) and (ii) China’s unrelenting presence in South Sudan, in spite of growing violence, 
essentially because crude oil from South Sudan accounts for about 5 percent of fuel imports 
into China (Aguirre, 2014). This interpretation follows from Elu and Price (2010) on China’s 
long-term strategy, which entails an oil diplomacy requiring continuous engagement with 
countries that are characterised by violence, internal/civil conflicts and political strife.  
As a policy implication, terrorism may induce positive effects on some commodity 
exports. Managers of MNCs should therefore be aware of the fact that terrorism may either 
positively or negatively influence fuel exports and in situations where the effect is negative, 
development assistance may not be so much of an instrumental policy tool in dampening the 
perilous effects on fuel exports. Hence, it is up to these MNCs to take the necessary measures 
to decrease the negative effects of terrorism on their business operations. Given that MNCs 
are often the target of terrorism, especially in oil-rich countries, engaging in corporate 
practices that are friendly to human rights and environmental protection could send a positive 
signal to the population that the MNCs have inclusive and sustainable development plans for 
local communities. Improving Corporate Social Responsibility standards is a step in this 
direction.  
 Whereas terrorism may not unequivocally disrupt fuel exports as has been established 
in this study, MNCs need to take preventive steps in order to reduce potentially damaging 
effects on their cost of doing business. Five main preventive measures may be exploited. 
First, the amelioration of physical security embodies equipment, plant and personnel, 
especially in places of higher risks. Second, security consultants often provide very valuable 
insights into politico-economic risks associated with areas in which MNCs are operating. 
Such insights are important for informed decision-making. Third, since the global supply 
chains of MNCs may be exposed to attacks, improving security in transportation networks is 
vital, though very difficult. Fourth, a measure by which MNCs can mitigate cost could be to 
reduce and/or avoid investment in areas that are likely to be heavily affected by terrorism. 
Fifth, uncertainty associated with politically-risky investment environments can be mitigated 
by subscribing to insurance schemes.  
5. Conclusion and Further Research  
This study has employed quantile regressions to assess the conditional role of foreign 
aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports in 78 developing 
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counties for the period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid indicators have been used 
whereas terrorism has included: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. 
The following findings have been established.  First, the effects of terrorism are both positive 
and negative across quantiles and specifications, with the impact most apparent in the highest 
and lowest quantiles. Second, while bilateral aid consistently decreases (increases) fuel 
exports at the top (bottom) quantiles, multilateral aid consistently decreases fuel exports in  
the top quantiles. Third, but for negative thresholds in the 50
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile, 
interaction effects between bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics are overwhelmingly not 
significant. Conversely, but for transnational terrorism, the interaction effects between 
multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics significantly have negative thresholds. The hypothesis 
of a positive threshold is only confirmed for transnational terrorism and multilateral aid at the 
90
th
 decile.  Justifications for unexpected signs have been discussed.  
Four main inferences have been established: (i) terrorism may induce positive effects 
on some commodity exports, (ii) relative to multilateral, bilateral aid more positively 
influences fuel exports in low-fuel exporting countries, (iii) while bilateral aid should be 
encouraged in stimulating fuel exports in low-exporting countries, the composition and use of 
multilateral foreign aid should also be re-structured in order to reverse its negative effect on 
fuel exports in high-exporting countries and (iv) it is important to first establish the 
connection between foreign aid and fuel exports before employing the former to mitigate the 
potentially negative effect of terrorism on the latter. 
The resulting managerial implications which are consistent with Oh and Oetzel (2016) 
can be summarised in the following.  Since, terrorism augments social unrest and imposes 
additional costs to the doing of business; managers of Multinational Companies (MNCs) can 
more effectively lessen the potentially damaging effects on their operations by leveraging on 
the experience of host governments in the mitigation of negative externalities of terrorism on 
development outcomes. One approach by which host governments could fight terrorism is by 
reliance on foreign aid flows. In the absence of robust evidence that such foreign aid can be 
instrumental for the purpose of reducing terrorism, MNCs need to consolidate preventive 
measures. 
There is obviously room for further research in (i) assessing channels through which 
terrorism negatively and positively influences fuel exports and (ii) distinguishing 
development assistance by sectors in order to improve the extant of knowledge on how aid-
specific categories influence the established interconnections.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Fuel Export  FuelExp Ln. Fuel Export (as a % of Merchandise Export)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category is unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Fuel Export (ln) 1.007 2.785 -11.366 4.585 503 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix 
              
LnFuelExp LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 -0.106 0.095 0.016 -0.002 0.230 -0.090 0.044 0.066 0.013 0.044 0.207 0.043 LnFuelExp 
 1.000 0.296 -0.230 0.043 -0.267 -0.289 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 -0.122 -0.299 LnTrade 
  1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
   1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
    1.000 0.114 0.183 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
     1.000 0.721 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
        1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
         1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
          1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
           1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
            1.000 Civcon 
              
  LnFuelExp: Fuel Export.  LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  
Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total 
number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
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